Introduction
The field of integrated assessment of climate change is undergoing a paradigm shift towards the analysis of potentially abrupt and irreversible climate changes (Alley et al., 2003; Keller et al., 2006b) . Early integrated studies broke important new ground in exploring the relationship between the costs and benefits of reducing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions (e.g., Nordhaus, 1991; Manne and Richels, 1991; or Tol, 1997) . These studies project the climate response to anthropogenic CO 2 emissions to be relatively smooth and typically conclude that the projected benefits of reducing CO 2 emissions would justify only small reductions in CO 2 emissions in a cost-benefit framework. The validity of the oftenassumed smooth climate response is, however, questionable, given how the climate system has responded to forcing in the geological past. Before the Anthropocene, the geological time period where humans have started to influence the global biogeochemical cycles considerably (Crutzen, 2002) , the predominant responses of the climate system were forced by small changes in solar insolation occurring on timescales of thousands of years (Berger and Loutre, 1991) . Yet this slow and smooth forcing apparently triggered abrupt climate changes -a threshold response where the climate system moved between different basins of attraction (Berger, 1990; Clement et al., 2001) . Anthropogenic forcing may trigger climate threshold responses in the future (Alley et al., 2003; Keller et al., 2006b) . Examples of such threshold responses include (i) a collapse of the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (Rahmstorf, 2000; Stommel, 1961) , (ii) a disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (Mercer, 1978; Oppenheimer, 1998) , (iii) abrupt vegetation changes (Claussen et al., 1999; Scheffer et al., 2001) , or (iv) changes in properties of the El Nino Southern Oscillation, ENSO (Fedorov and Philander, 2000; Timmermann, 2001 ). Here we focus on the first two examples: a possible collapse of the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation and a possible disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
Our analysis addresses three main questions. (i) What underlying mechanisms define a climate threshold? (ii) What are the key scientific uncertainties in predicting whether these thresholds may be crossed in the future? (iii) What might be reasonable order-of-magnitude estimates of the expected economic value of reducing these uncertainties? Our analysis suggests that climate strategies designed to reduce the risk of crossing climate thresholds have to be designed in the face of large uncertainties. Some of the key uncertainties (e.g., the sensitivity of the meridional overturning circulation to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions) can be reduced by observation systems. We conclude by identifying future research needs.
28.2
What defines a climate threshold?
Slow and smooth forcing is capable of inducing abrupt and persistent changes in the climate system -in other words, the system exhibits a threshold response. What, then, is a climate threshold and how can crossing a climate threshold cause abrupt climate change? Broadly speaking, a threshold is the level of perturbation below which the response of the climate system is proportional to the perturbation, and above which the response to a small perturbation might lead to an abrupt and persistent change. An analysis of the temperature deviations in central Greenland over the past 25 000 years illustrates the possible implications of climate thresholds (Figure 28 .1) (Meese et al., 1994b; Stuiver et al., 1995) . A key conclusion from this record is that climate change during the Holocene (the current interglacial, approximately the past 10 000 years) was relatively smooth compared with the pre-Holocene record. One salient example of abrupt climate change is the climate period known as the Younger Dryas (YD). During the YD, temperatures changed by close to 10 C within a few decades (Alley, 2000) . Crossing climate thresholds has probably caused abrupt climate change in the past. In the following sections, we briefly discuss basic mechanisms that could drive potential threshold responses of the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
28.2.1
The North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation
One key hypothesis to explain the Younger Dryas is associated with sudden changes in the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) in the North Atlantic (Alley et al., 2002) . The meridional overturning circulation is technically defined as the zonally integrated north-south flow in an ocean basin. In the North Atlantic, surface currents (e.g., the Gulf Stream) transport warm and salty waters to the high latitudes in the North Atlantic, where cooling increases the sea-surface density. Eventually, cooling-induced deep convection and sinking takes place; the surface waters sink and flow southward as cold deep currents (Dickson and Brown, 1994) . The MOC is part of the global deepwater circulation system, which is sometimes called the "conveyor belt" (Broecker, 1991) . In the Atlantic, the MOC accounts for most of the oceanic heat transport (Hall and Bryden, 1982) . One effect of this northward heat transport through the MOC is seen in the relatively mild climate of Western Europe. Paleoclimatic records suggest that the MOC has undergone rapid changes in the past. Evidence derived from oceanic sediment and model simulations suggest that the above mentioned YD was a global scale event (Denton and Hendy, 1994; Yu and Wright, 2001 ) and associated with a collapse of the North Atlantic MOC (Manabe and Stouffer, 1995; McManus et al., 2004; Teller et al., 2002) . Furthermore, numerical simulations suggest that anthropogenic CO 2 emissions may cause a weakening or even a collapse of the MOC (Cubasch and Meehl, 2001; Gregory et al., 2005; Schmittner et al., 2005) . Such an effect would entail a reduction in the North Atlantic heat transport, which in turn would result in considerable and global-scale climate changes (Vellinga and Wood, 2002) .
In the Atlantic, the MOC comprises both a buoyancy-forced contribution and wind-driven meridional transports. The density-driven part of the MOC is maintained by density contrasts in the ocean due to differences in the heat and salt content of the water (and hence often referred to as thermohaline circulation). Changes in the surface fluxes of heat and freshwater influence the sea-surface density contrasts. The warm and salty surface waters transported by the MOC to the convection regions have opposite effects on the density of the surface waters. In principle, the import of warm water acts to reduce the density, whereas the import of saline water acts to increase the density. In addition, at high latitudes the ocean generally loses heat and gains freshwater from continental river runoff and precipitation, which again have opposite effects on density. Predicting MOC changes thus requires a detailed understanding of the various driving processes and the combined effect of the associated feedback mechanisms.
Two specific feedbacks are thought to be key drivers of the MOC response to anthropogenic forcing (Figure 28 .2) (Stocker et al., 2001) . One feedback acts through the interactions between sea surface temperature, MOC intensity, and the low-latitude advection. This is a negative feedback, acting to stabilize the MOC. Consider a perturbation to the system temporarily weakening the MOC. The weakened MOC causes a slowdown in the advection towards the deepwater formation site. This slowed advection increases the time the surface waters are exposed to the colder atmosphere and increases the heat loss. The resulting decrease in sea surface temperature increases the density of the surface waters and acts to strengthen the MOC. Hence, this feedback acts to stabilize the MOC.
Why, then, is the MOC potentially unstable? The key to this question lies in the complex positive feedbacks, imposed, for example, through the interactions between sea surface salinity and MOC strength. The North Atlantic is an area of net freshwater input (Baumgartner and Reichel, 1975) . Hence, the more the transit of surface waters across the North Atlantic slows down, the more sea surface salinity decreases. Decreasing sea surface salinities act to decrease the density of the surface waters. As a result, a perturbation temporarily weakening the MOC decreases the advection. The decreased advection causes a decreased sea surface salinity. The decreased sea surface salinity then causes a weakening MOC, reinforcing the initial perturbation. This positive feedback amplifies an initial perturbation and makes the systems potentially unstable. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions can cause a MOC collapse by decreasing the density gradient between surface and deep waters. This occurs through two main mechanisms: the increase in sea surface temperatures and the decrease in sea surface salinities at the current deepwater formation sites (Schmittner and Stocker, 1999) due to changes in the hydrological cycle resulting from anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. These processes decrease the water densities at the surface faster than the densities of deeper water, hence they decrease the density gradient.
The West Antarctic Ice Sheet
The West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) may disintegrate in response to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Mercer, 1978; Oppenheimer, 1998) . The consequences of WAIS disintegration could include a global sea level rise of about 5 m and disruption of global oceanic circulation patterns (Oppenheimer, 1998) . The WAIS may disintegrate abruptly (i.e., on multi-century timescales) as a result of positive feedbacks deep in the ice sheet that trigger a threshold response to climate change, as in the case of the MOC. The positive feedbacks might be activated in part as a dynamical response to the rapid disintegration of floating ice shelves at the ice sheet periphery (Oppenheimer and Alley, 2005) . It is also plausible that WAIS would disintegrate only gradually and exhibit no threshold behavior, and perhaps only for a very large warming (Huybrechts and de Wolde, 1999; Thomas et al., 2004) . Three positive feedback mechanisms that have received considerable attention are (i) the slip-rate-temperature feedback (Macayeal, 1992 (Macayeal, , 1993 , (ii) the height-melting rate feedback (Huybrechts and de Wolde, 1999) and (iii) surface melting-bottom lubrication (Zwally et al., 2002) (Figure 28 .3). The first feedback occurs when an ice flow creates friction at the interface between ice and the sub-ice basal material such as bedrock or sediments. Frictional heating causes melting and the generation of water that further lubricates ice movement. Higher ice velocity leads to additional frictional heating, and so forth. The height-melt rate feedback occurs as the height of the melting ice surface lowers, bringing it into altitudes of higher temperature and accelerated melting. The feedback between surface-melt and bottom lubrication occurs when water from meltwater ponds at the surface penetrates crevices and works its way to and lubricates the ice sheet base. The resulting accelerated ice flow would trigger the first two feedbacks, and so on. These feedbacks also operate in the Greenland ice sheet, where an abrupt disintegration has also been hypothesized recently (Oppenheimer and Alley, 2005) .
28.2.3
What levels of anthropogenic climate change may trigger these threshold responses?
The location of these climate thresholds (in terms of CO 2 , temperature, or other parameter spaces) is at this time uncertain. Consider, for example, the large range in current predictions about the MOC response to anthropogenic CO 2 emissions (Gregory et al., 2005; Schmittner et al., 2005) . One class of sensitive models (e.g., Stouffer and Manabe, 1999) shows a considerable MOC weakening starting around the year 2000. The other class of insensitive models (e.g., Latif et al., 2000) shows a much lower MOC sensitivity to anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. The divergence in the MOC predictions is due to differences in the representation of key processes. Relevant examples include the approximations to describe the hydrological cycle, the vertical transport of heat in the ocean interior, and deepwater formation. Given the caveats introduced by these large uncertainties, the results from the current models generation suggest that stabilizing atmospheric CO 2 somewhere below approximately 700 ppm may weaken the MOC, but typically avoid a MOC collapse (Manabe and Stouffer, 1994; Stocker and Schmittner, 1997; Gregory et al., 2005; Schmittner et al., 2005) . Models describing the future response of the WAIS face similar problems associated with model approximations. WAIS models incorporating some of the positive feedback mechanisms do not exhibit rapid WAIS threshold behavior but rather a slow, millennial-scale melting in a warmer world (Macayeal, 1992) . The ice sheet dynamics are, however, represented incompletely in these models (Bindschadler, 1997; Oppenheimer and Alley, 2004) . Given the limited predictive capabilities of the current WAIS models, one might be able to derive a rough estimate of the WAIS sensitivity to anthropogenic climate change from an analysis of sea level changes during the last interglacial period. At that time, global mean temperatures were probably about 2 C warmer than today (Petit et al., 1997; Oppenheimer and Alley, 2004) . Some (rather uncertain) evidence based on coral stands and erosion patterns suggests that the sea level was 2-6 m higher during this period, a change consistent with the hypothesis of a WAIS (or Greenland ice sheet) disintegration (Neumann and Hearty, 1996; Carew, 1997; Kindler and Strasser, 1997) . Hence, a precautionary interpretation of the paleorecord may suggest that avoiding an anthropogenic warming beyond 2.5 C would be necessary to reduce the risk of WAIS disintegration to low levels.
The discussion so far illustrates that predictions about the future behavior of the MOC and the WAIS are highly uncertain. The evidence suggests the approximate location of the climate limits for the WAIS and the MOC thresholds may be located around 2.5 C and 700 ppm CO 2 , respectively. Whether these threshold responses would indeed be triggered as these climate limits are crossed is currently uncertain. One relevant decision problem is how to design near-term strategy in the face of these uncertain thresholds. We analyze this decision problem using a simple integrated assessment model of climate change.
28.3
A simple integrated assessment model of climate change
We adopt the Dynamic Integrated assessment model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) as a starting point. The DICE model has been used in many previous studies to analyze the tradeoffs involved in designing a climate strategy in the face of potential climate thresholds (Keller et al., 2004; Nordhaus, 1994) . The DICE model is an integrated assessment model of climate change developed by William Nordhaus and colleagues (Nordhaus, 1993; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) . The DICE model relies, as any model does, on numerous simplifying assumptions (Schulz and Kasting, 1997; Tol, 1994) , but has the advantage of linking the complex interactions between the social, economic, andscientific systems in a consistent and transparent way. Because the DICE model is described in great detail in previous publications (Nordhaus, 1994; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) , we outline here only the key structural elements. The model is based on a globally aggregated optimal growth model (Ramsey, 1928) . A Cobb-Douglas production function describes the flow of economic output as a function of the exogenous factors population and level of technology and the endogenous factor capital. The output is allocated among consumption, investment in capital stock, and CO 2 abatement. The objective is to maximize the discounted sum of the utility of per capita consumption weighted by population size. The two instruments are investments into capital and into reduction of CO 2 emissions ("CO 2 abatement"). Carbon dioxide abatement can improve the objective function as it weakens the negative impact of production on the utility of consumption through global climate change. This negative impact occurs because production activity generates CO 2 that -in the absence of CO 2 abatement -is vented into the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere act to increase atmospheric CO 2 concentrations that, in turn, act to increase globally averaged temperatures. Increases in globally averaged temperature are taken as a simple approximation for climate change (including, for example, precipitation changes or sea-level rise) and cause economic damages that reduce economic output.
We modify the DICE-99 model (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) to account for uncertainty, climate thresholds, and learning in three ways. First, we represent uncertainty by uncertain states of the world (SOW). We consider two SOW with respect to climate thresholds: a sensitive and an insensitive case. In the sensitive SOW, the climate threshold is triggered once the climate limit (e.g., 2.5 C for the WAIS threshold) is crossed. In the insensitive SOW, the climate threshold is not triggered. The decisionmaker is initially uncertain about which state of the world is the correct one and assumes equal probabilities of the sensitive and the insensitive state. At some future point in time (the learning point), the decision-maker learns about the true SOW. Before the learning point, decisions are made in ignorance of the true SOW. After the learning point, decisions become state-dependent as the decisionmaker learns about the true SOW; i.e., the decisionmaker acts with perfect information about the SOW. Note that the decisionmaker does not know which SOW will be revealed at the learning point. The problem is hence to design a strategy that is optimal over both SOWs before the learning point and that can then be adjusted to the revealed SOW after learning occurred. In other words, the decisionmaker has to choose a single strategy before the learning point and one strategy for each considered SOW after the learning point.
As a second change to the DICE-99 (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) structure, we consider a decision criterion that is risk averse with respect to crossing climate thresholds. Specifically, we adopt an interpretation that crossing a WAIS or MOC threshold would violate the objective in Article 2 of the United Nations Framework convention on Climate Chance to "prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC, 1992) . This interpretation follows several previous studies (O 'Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002; Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2004; Keller et al., 2005) but is certainly open to debate. We will return to the effects of different decision criteria below. The last, but arguably minor change to the DICE-99 model is to adjust the parameters related to the exogenous trends in productivity growth and emissions-output ratio to result in a business-as-usual CO 2 carbon emissions in the mid-range of the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC, 2000) . We use this integrated assessment model to analyze the potential economic value of reducing key scientific uncertainties surrounding climate thresholds.
Results and discussion
We first analyze constrained optimal strategies with and without learning about the sensitivity of the climate threshold. This analysis is illustrated in Figure 28 .4 for the example of the WAIS threshold located at a 2.5 C climate limit. Note that a 2.5 C warming limit relative to pre-industrial conditions is roughly equivalent to a 2 C limit relative to the current conditions. This is because globally averaged surface temperatures have increased by approximately 0.6 C over the past 150 years (Folland et al., 2001) . For the strategy without learning, abatement increases from roughly 10% in 2005 to approximately 90% within this century. The key to understanding this strategy lies in the objective to stay below the 2.5 C limit as long as the uncertainty about the WAIS threshold is unresolved (Keller et al., 2005) . A strategy to limit globally averaged temperature increase to 2.5 C requires that the economy should be almost completely decarbonized on a century timescale (Keller et al., 2005; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) .
The uncertainty about the WAIS might be reduced in the future as new observations become available or as the numerical models improve. In this case, the strategy can be designed with the projected learning date in mind. The effect of considering future learning on optimal strategy in the model is to decrease the near-term abatement (before the learning point). After the learning point, optimal abatement increases in the sensitive SOW, and decreases in the insensitive SOW. Before the learning point, optimal abatement under uncertainty and learning is below the optimal abatement without learning. After the learning point, the situation is reversed. This reversal compensates for the lower abatement levels under learning and is required to achieve the 2.5 C temperature stabilization.
Reducing the scientific uncertainty can improve climate strategy and have an economic value (Manne and Richels, 1991; Nordhaus and Popp, 1997) . Consider, for example, the effect of learning shown in Figure 28 .4. Without learning, the abatement is too high for both SOW before the learning occurs and is too high for the insensitive SOW after the learning point. The expected value of information (EVI) quantifies how the availability of information improves strategy. We estimate the EVI by the net present value of consumption gains due to the availability of the information. We analyze the EVI for the sensitivity of the MOC and the WAIS thresholds and as a function of the learning time (Figure 28 .5). The EVI is higher for the more stringent climate limit (i.e., the 2.5 C limit constrains the allowable CO 2 emissions more than the 700 ppm limit). The later that learning occurs, the lower the EVI. Learning about the WAIS and MOC sensitivity within the next five decades has an EVI in this simple model of roughly 3 and 0.5% of gross world product (GWP), respectively.
A strategy to avoid a temperature threshold is very sensitive to the current uncertainty about the climate sensitivity (Caldeira et al., 2003; Keller et al., 2000) . The climate sensitivity is the (hypothetical) equilibrium response of the globally averaged temperature to a doubling of the atmospheric CO 2 concentration. Current estimates of the climate sensitivity show a considerable uncertainty, predominantly due to uncertainties in the climate forcing, the climate observations, and the kinetics of oceanic heat uptake (Andronova and Schlesinger, 2001) . Considering climate thresholds dramatically increases the economic value of information about the climate sensitivity (Figure 28.6) . We represent the uncertainty about the climate sensitivity by three states of the world based on stratified Latin Hypercube samples from the estimated probability density function (Andronova and Schlesinger, 2001; McKay et al., 1979) . Learning about the climate sensitivity in 2015 in the case of no climate threshold (i.e., the original structure of the DICE-99 model) has an economic value of information of roughly 10 billion US$. (Figure 28.6) . This is the same order of magnitude as the previous estimate of Nordhaus and Popp (1997) using the DICE-94 model structure. Considering temperature limits increases the EVI about the climate sensitivity considerably. For a learning time in 2045, the EVI about the climate sensitivity increase by more than an order of magnitude as the strategy objective changes from no temperature limit to a temperature limit of 2.5 C (Figure 28 .6). The EVI increases as the temperature limit is reduced even further (illustrated by the EVI for a temperature limit of 1.5 o C). Our economic analysis suggests that information about the sensitivity of climate thresholds can have considerable economic value. This poses the question of how one might gather information about the threshold sensitivity and whether investments into such an information gathering process would pass a benefit-cost test. In the following section, we briefly outline key steps towards such an analysis for the example of the potential MOC threshold response.
28.5
An outline for an economic analysis of MOC observation systems
Numerous studies address the question of when one might detect a potential MOC change (Santer et al., 1995; Kleinen et al., 2003; Vellinga and Wood, 2004; Keller et al., 2006a; Baehr et al., 2007) . These studies use model simulations of the future MOC behavior, sample possible observations, and use detection methods to derive statistical statements regarding the detection probability over time. Santer et al. (1995) analyzed the task of detecting a MOC trend using annual and perfect observations in a stochastically forced ocean model. They conclude that MOC changes would not be detected within the first 100 years, predominantly because of the high internal MOC variability in their model simulations and the adopted detection methodology. Baehr et al. (2007) analyzed another coupled ocean-atmosphere model and considered the effects of observation errors. They conclude that observations at high (i.e., annual) frequency and a low observation error might well detect a MOC trend within a few decades in the ECHAM5/ MPI-OM model (Marsland et al., 2003) . Vellinga and Wood (2004) come to similar conclusions to Baehr et al. (2007) methodology, and the observation system on the detection probability of MOC changes. One key question often neglected in MOC detection studies is whether the assumed observations are logistically feasible. Studies assuming perfect observations at very high frequencies (e.g., Vellinga and Wood, 2004) may yield important theoretical insights, but are perhaps only of limited use for the decision problem in the real world. The MOC observation systems that have been implemented so far yield infrequent and uncertain MOC estimates. These current observation systems fall into two broad categories. The first category of MOC estimations relies on the inversion of hydrographic observations from ship-based transoceanic sections (Ganachaud and Wunsch, 2000; Peacock et al., 2000) . This observation method has a likely observation error between 2 and 5 Sverdrups (Sv) (Ganachaud and Wunsch, 2000; Peacock et al., 2000;  1 Sv is equal to one million cubic meters of water per second). The observation frequency for this method is very low, since these observations are costly and personnel-intensive. The second method is based on mooring arrays and yields higher observation frequencies. One example of such a high frequency observation system is the recently installed array at 26 N Schiermeier, 2004) . The setup of the array has been extensively tested in numerical models (Baehr et al., 2004 (Baehr et al., , 2007 Hirschi et al., 2003) . These model-based studies suggest that this observation system has the potential for lower observation errors than the ship-based method. Estimating the observation error for this array is an area of ongoing research. Here we explore the implications of observation errors of 1 and 3 Sv (Figure 28.7) .
Detecting changes occurs -in general -faster for more frequent and less uncertain observations (Figure 28.7) . One measure of how fast detection would occur is the detection time, the time period needed to be able to reject the nullhypothesis of no trend at p < 0.05 (Santer et al., 1995) . We explore the range of MOC detection times in the model runs of Manabe and Stouffer (1994) , using a simple frequentist detection method that accounts for autocorrelation and observation errors (Baehr et al., 2007) . In this simple example, detection would occur on a decadal timescale (Figure 28.7 ). An observation system with observation errors of between 1 and 3 Sv and annual observations would yield median detection times between approximately 10 to 50 years for the considered model. Our economic analysis summarized in Figure 28 .5 suggests that resolving the current uncertainty about the MOC response on a decadal timescale would have considerable economic value in the framework of the adopted economic model. This opens up the possibility that the economic benefits associated with MOC observation systems may well exceed the necessary investments. It is important to stress that detection of MOC changes is not equivalent to the prediction of an MOC threshold response (the information analyzed in the economic analysis, above).
28.6
Open research questions Our analysis is adorned by numerous caveats that point to future research questions. Here we briefly discuss two issues relevant to the design of sound climate strategies in the face of uncertain climate thresholds.
First, similar to Baehr et al. (2007) , the detection analysis shown in Figure 28 .7 neglects the potential that additional tracers could be used in an optimal fingerprint analysis (Bell, 1982) . MOC changes are associated with specific trends of tracers such as oxygen (Joos et al., 2003; Matear and Hirst, 2003) or chlorofluorocarbons (Schlosser et al., 1991) . The predicted oxygen changes, for example, exceed the typical data-based estimation errors (Keller et al., 2002; Matear et al., 2000) . This suggests that adding tracer observations to an MOC observation system might be a promising strategy to improve the detection and prediction capabilities. Second, our current study expands on previous work (Keller et al., 2004; Keller et al., 2006a) by considering a precautionary decisionmaking criterion. It can be argued that the decision criterion applied in this study is a more appropriate description of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) than the expected utility maximization framework often applied to this problem (e.g., Nordhaus, 1992) . To characterize the applied decision criterion of stakeholders and decisionmakers in this problem is important because different choices (e.g., expected utility maximization without a priori constraints (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) , reliability constraints (Keller et al., 2000) , or robust decisionmaking (Lempert, 2002) would be likely to lead to different EVI estimates and different suggestions on Manabe and Stouffer (1994) . Shown are the cumulative density functions of the detection times (when the null-hypothesis of no change compared with the unforced control run can be rejected at p < 0.05) for the 4 · CO 2 scenario in Manabe and Stouffer (1994) . The analysis uses the detection method described in Baehr et al. (2006) . Compared are two observation systems with observation errors of 1 Sv and 3 Sv (upper and lower panel, respectively) . See text as well as Baehr et al. (2006) for details.
how to design an economically efficient MOC observation system.
Conclusions
We draw from our analysis four main conclusions. First, crossing climate thresholds may be interpreted as "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." Second, strategies addressing climate thresholds have to be made in a situation of deep uncertainty. Third, investments into welldesigned observation systems have the potential to reduce key uncertainties about climate thresholds. Finally, important issues (e.g., what framework best approximates the applied decision criteria; how this affects the design of "optimal" observation system; or how one might detect early warning signs of climate thresholds besides the MOC) require more detailed attention.
